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Libertarianism, Left and Right 
Libertarianism is a school of moral/political thought that is committed to full or 
near-full individual self-ownership. In the realm of distributive justice, 
libertarianism is probably most famous (or infamous) for its rejection of 
redistributive taxation. However, the libertarian view of distributive justice is less 
monolithic and more complex than is often recognized, and in this chapter we aim to 
clarify (and in in places tentatively defend) this view.1 We begin by briefly defining 
“distributive justice” and “libertarianism” (Section 1). We then turn to considering 
self-ownership (Section 2), property rights in natural resources (Section 3), and 
property rights in human-made goods (Section 4). Finally, we consider directions 
for future research (Section 5) and conclude. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
1.1 Justice and Distributive Justice 
While there are many ways of understanding “justice” ( Vallentyne, 2003a), 
for the purposes of this chapter, we take justice to be concerned with enforceable 
moral duties, that is, those duties whose compliance may be permissibly induced 
using force or threat thereof.2 We define distributive justice as that area of justice 
relating to the distribution of economic benefits and burdens.  
                                                        
1 One of us, Peter Vallentyne, is a left libertarian.  The other, Joseph Mazor, is a sympathetic critic of 
libertarianism.  However, in this chapter we adopt the perspective of defenders of libertarianism. 
2 There are coherent pacifist versions of libertarianism that recognize various libertarian duties but 
no enforceable duties. Such libertarian theories would have nothing to say about justice as we define 
it here. Since every prominent libertarian thinks that coercive force may be used to protect property 
rights, we will not consider these pacifist libertarian theories here. 
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1.2 Libertarianism 
 As the term suggests, libertarianism entails a commitment to respect for 
liberty. However, this is a commitment to a very particular conception of liberty: 
liberty as full or near-full self-ownership. The commitment to this type of liberty can 
be justified on a variety of grounds,3 including consequentialism (e.g., Epstein, 
1998), social contract (e.g., Narveson, 1998), autonomy (e.g., Grunebaum, 2000), 
natural rights (e.g., Mack, 1990), and the value of freedom from interference.4 We 
will not explore the foundations of the commitment to self-ownership in this 
chapter. We will focus instead on explaining this commitment and its implications 
for distributive justice. 
 
2. Full and Near-Full Self-Ownership 
Self-ownership is simply a special case of ownership where the owner and 
the thing owned are one and the same. We therefore begin our discussion of self-
ownership by considering the more general concept of ownership. 
 
2.1 Ownership 
 Ownership can be best understood as a collection of certain Hohfeldian 
liberties, claim-rights, powers, and immunities that some person has with respect to 
some entity.5 We will refer to these rights as property rights. These include:6 
                                                        
3 For a critique of the libertarian commitment to self-ownership, see (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2008).  
4 For a debate on whether maximal equal negative liberty leads to traditional libertarianism 
conclusions, see (Narveson and Sterba, 2010). For a discussion, see (Vallentyne, 2011). 
5 For a more detailed account of the nature of these rights, see (Hohfeld, 1919). 
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(1) Control rights over the entity (liberty-rights to use, a power to authorize use or 
encroachment by others, and a claim-right that others not use or encroach upon the 
entity without one’s authorization),  
 
(2) Rights to transfer one’s property rights over the entity to others (by sale, rental, 
gift, or loan),  
 
(3) Enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior restraint, punishment) with respect to 
others’ violations or potential violations of one’s property rights over the entity,  
 
(4) Rights to compensation when someone violates one’s property rights over the 
entity without one’s permission,  
 
(5) Immunities to the non-consensual loss of one’s property rights over the entity. 
 
We will not take a position on which property rights are precisely necessary 
and sufficient for ownership. However, we will assume that an entity’s owner must 
at least have liberty-rights to use the entity and either a claim-right against others’ 
encroachment on the entity or a right to appropriate compensation if others use the 
entity without her permission.7 We take it that these are the minimal requirements 
for ownership. The more property rights an owner has with respect to an entity, the 
stronger her ownership over the entity is.  
It is worth emphasizing straightaway that even the strongest form of 
ownership over an entity does not guarantee a person the effective moral freedom 
to make use of that entity in any practical sense. After all, there are basically no 
actions that someone takes with respect to an entity that use or encroach upon only 
that entity. For example, when I ride my motorcycle, I occupy space, discharge 
pollution into the air, and generate sound waves that encroach on other individuals. 
Ownership of my motorcycle only grants me a liberty-right to use the motorcycle 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 This list is enumerated and briefly discussed in (Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka, 2005: 203-204). 
7 We set aside here the important question of what constitutes appropriate compensation. 
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itself. Before we can conclude that I have moral permission to ride my motorcycle 
somewhere, we need to know about my property rights with respect to all the 
entities that my motorcycle ride would use or encroach upon. This is a general point 
that applies to all types of ownership, including self-ownership, which we turn to 
next. 
 
2.2 Self-Ownership 
 Self-ownership is ownership of one’s own person.8 Setting aside a variety of 
complex issues about personal identity, we will make the simplifying assumption 
that a person is her body. Thus, one can think of self-ownership intuitively as giving 
an individual (moral) rights over her body that are similar to the legal rights that 
slave-owners had (and in some parts of the world unfortunately still have) over 
their slaves (Cohen, 1995: 68).  
A wide variety of theories are committed to granting individuals some type of 
self-ownership (e.g., Thomson, 1992: Ch. 8). What distinguishes libertarianism from 
these other theories is the commitment to the following key moral claim (or 
something similar to it): Every rational agent initially possesses full self-ownership.9 
We will refer to this as the full self-ownership thesis.  
 
                                                        
8 As Cohen (1995: 68-69) argues, the term “self” in self-ownership has a purely reflexive significance. 
9 More accurately, the thesis requires that every agent possess the same set of self-ownership rights. 
By “initially,” we mean before the agent contracts away any of these rights or loses these rights as a 
result of engaging in rights violations. 
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2.3 Full Self-Ownership 
Full self-ownership assigns each person the logically strongest control rights 
(1) and transfer rights (2) over herself possible.10 By “logically strongest” we mean 
both maximally stringent and maximally extensive. “Maximally stringent” means that 
the ownership rights can never be overridden by other moral considerations (e.g., 
those having to do with human welfare). “Maximally extensive” means the most 
complete list of Hohfeldian rights within the relevant categories possible.11 
However, full self-ownership does not assign a person the logically strongest 
self-ownership rights possible in categories (3), (4), and (5). The reason is this: It 
would be impossible to grant every person (or indeed, even more than one person) 
full self-ownership were it defined this way. After all, the stronger we make one 
person’s rights of compensation and enforcement (i.e., what she may do to others in 
self-defense), the weaker we have to make others’ immunity to the non-consensual 
loss of self-ownership rights, and vice versa. Thus, libertarians define full self-
ownership instead as granting a person a set of self-ownership enforcement rights 
(3), compensation rights (4), and immunity to loss of self-ownership rights (5) that 
are as strong as possible subject to the constraint of being compatible with others 
having the same set of rights in categories (3), (4), & (5) over themselves 
(Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka, 2005: 203-205). 
                                                        
10 We also assume that a full self-owner cannot be deprived of her other property rights simply 
because she exercises her self-ownership rights.  So depriving a person of her right to breathe air 
(assuming that she already has that right) simply because she smiled would violate the full-self 
ownership thesis. 
11 Our discussion of extensiveness and stringency follows (Wall, 2009: 400). 
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 Having defined the concept of full self-ownership, we now turn to 
considering three prominent criticisms of the full self-ownership thesis having to do 
with indeterminacy, small encroachments or risks of encroachments, and 
enforceable duties to assist. 
 
2.4 Is Full Self-Ownership Indeterminate? 
Some theorists have criticized libertarianism by arguing that the concept of 
full self-ownership is indeterminate (Fried, 2004: 78-80). And indeed, there is some 
truth to this criticism. Full self-ownership is indeterminate when it comes to the 
question of what a person may do in self-defense. Since it is the case that the 
stronger we make one person’s enforcement and compensation rights (3 & 4), the 
weaker we have to make another’s immunity to non-consensual loss of self-
ownership rights (5) and vice versa, there are admittedly many possible bundles of 
rights in categories (3), (4), and (5) that would satisfy the definition of full self-
ownership.12 One conception of full self-ownership could grant me full rights to 
defend my body, including the right to kill you if you are threatening to punch me. 
Another could deny me the right to do anything to you in response to your attack on 
my body. Another might provide me with enforcement rights that are proportional 
in some way to the threat you pose. Each of these is an admissible conception of full 
                                                        
12 However, full self-ownership is not completely indeterminate in the realms of rights in categories 
(3), (4), and (5). For example, full self-ownership cannot include both strong rights in (3) & (4) and 
strong rights in (5) (since this would not be compatible with granting others the same set of rights). 
It also cannot include both weak rights in (3) & (4) and weak rights in (5) (since it would be possible 
to give a person stronger property rights in one of the categories in this case without violating the 
compatibility constraint). 
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self-ownership. Thus, full-self ownership is indeed indeterminate when it comes to 
the question of self-defense. 
However, some theorists (e.g., Fried) have claimed that full self-ownership is 
also indeterminate when it comes to the question of whether one person may 
exercise her self-ownership control rights in ways that violate others’ self-
ownership control rights (Fried, 2004: 79). Libertarians, on the other hand, argue 
that there is no conflict between self-ownership control rights. For example, though 
you have full control rights over your fist, you cannot use your fist to punch my 
nose. Fried is unconvinced. She argues that such intuitively obvious examples 
simply obscure the indeterminacy regarding the conflict between different self-
ownership control rights. 
To evaluate Fried’s criticism, let us consider the following example: Realizing 
that I am running late to an important appointment, I start jogging while others are 
walking nearby, thereby introducing a small risk that my hand will accidentally hit 
someone else’s body. Is such jogging permissible? Fried’s argument suggests that 
full self-ownership thesis does not provide a determinate answer to this question.  
However, Fried is mistaken. She seems to think that libertarians must 
evaluate the permissibility of jogging by somehow balancing the control rights I 
have over my body against the control rights others have over their bodies to see 
which one would “win” (Fried, 2004: 79). This is wrong. The property rights I have 
over my body, even in their logically strongest form, do not include a right to take 
whatever actions I want with my body (just as full ownership over my motorcycle 
do not give me a right to ride the motorcycle wherever I want). To evaluate the 
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permissibility of my jogging, we need to know what rights I have with regards to any 
other entities that my jogging might encroach upon or use. Since my jogging 
generates a risk of incursion on others’ bodies, and since granting every person the 
logically strongest possible control-rights over their body gives them rights against 
even small risks of incursions, the full self-ownership thesis condemns my decision to 
start jogging, and does so in a fully determinate way.13 Although the prohibition on 
my jogging is admittedly problematic, the problem here is not indeterminacy.  
  
2.5 Full Self-Ownership and Small Incursions or Risks of Incursions 
 The problem illustrated by the jogging case is this: libertarianism seems 
committed to an implausibly strong version of self-ownership. The full self-
ownership thesis implies that any action that causes small incursions or risks of 
incursions on others is impermissible. Yet this seems to generate unacceptable 
restrictions on human activity. 
 Libertarians have considered this problem in the context of pollution and 
driving a car (Nozick, 1974: 78-81). However, as the jogging example suggests, the 
problem is more ubiquitous than is commonly recognized. In fact, almost any action 
(e.g., even carefully walking to the grocery store) will impose some additional risk of 
incursion on another’s body relative to the option of not doing anything. And since 
full self-ownership does not grant any weight to positive freedoms or human 
welfare in a contest with the rights that people have against (even tiny risks of) 
                                                        
13 Note that, while others’ self-ownership rights place moral restrictions on my actions in this case, 
these moral restrictions do not conflict with my self-ownership rights in any way.  
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bodily incursions, the troubling upshot of the full self-ownership thesis seems to be 
universal, morally-required paralysis (Mack, 2011: 112-113). 
However, this problem does not necessitate abandoning a commitment to 
strong self-ownership rights altogether. Instead, libertarians can respond to this 
problem by slightly stepping back from the full self-ownership thesis to endorse 
some version of the near-full self-ownership thesis: the thesis that every rational 
agent initially has a set of self-ownership rights that is “close” to full self-ownership 
rights (where “close” entails minor, circumscribed deviations either in terms of 
stringency or in terms of extensiveness).14 For example, in order to permit actions 
like jogging while others are around, libertarians might weaken individuals’ control 
rights over themselves to allow sufficiently small (i.e., “trivial”) incursions or risks of 
incursions by others. Needless to say, this theoretical move would require accounts 
of what counts as a trivial incursion and why such sufficiently small incursions are 
permissible. We will not explore these important issues further here.15 
 
2.6 Full Self-Ownership and Duties of Physical Assistance 
 We turn instead to a third criticism of the full self-ownership thesis relating 
to its rejection of enforceable duties to assist others. Even if a child is drowning in a 
shallow puddle next to the only person who is able to help, a commitment to the 
potential rescuer’s full self-ownership prohibits anyone (including the state) from 
                                                        
14 Admittedly, libertarianism is sometimes understood as requiring full self-ownership. On this view, 
any move to merely near-full self-ownership would be an abandonment of libertarianism in the 
strictest sense. However, such an understanding of libertarianism seems to us to be overly restrictive 
(it would exclude a large number of theorists commonly referred to as “libertarian”). 
15 For a discussion of the different libertarian approaches to address the problem of small incursions, 
see (Sobel, 2012). 
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forcing the person to help (even if doing so would be quite easy for her) (Arneson, 
2010: 183). Most people find this implication of the full self-ownership thesis to be 
unacceptable. 
 Libertarians have several responses to this important objection. First, they 
can point out that their theory does not reject all duties to physically assist. The core 
libertarian claim is only that individuals have no general, enforceable duties to 
physically aid others. This is compatible with their having special enforceable duties 
(e.g., from contract or past wronging) to aid specific others. It is also compatible 
with individuals having non-enforceable general moral duties to aid others. 
Second, libertarians can highlight the unappealing implications of principles 
that allow for blanket violations of self-ownership in order to assist the 
disadvantaged. For example, Nozick (1974: 206)pointed out that such principles 
might grant some entity (e.g., state) the right to forcibly remove non-essential 
organs (e.g., an eye from a person with two) in order to help those who are suffering 
(e.g., the congenitally blind). Such a forced transfer of eyes seems morally 
unacceptable.  
 Third, some libertarians have pointed out that it is often possible to alleviate 
suffering without violating anyone’s self-ownership. A great deal of human suffering 
could be alleviated if only the badly off owned more resources. Indeed, some 
libertarians (left-libertarians) have been particularly interested in the role that the 
distribution of natural resources can play in increasing the welfare of the less 
fortunate. We turn now to discussing the libertarian debate over natural resource 
property rights. 
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3. Property Rights in Natural Resources 
Natural resources can be defined (roughly) as objects of value16 that (1) have 
not been produced by any rational agent and (2) are not part of a being with moral 
standing.17 The debate over the ownership of natural resources defines the 
left/right libertarian divide. Left libertarians endorse some type of egalitarian 
ownership of natural resources. Right libertarians do not. 
 Note that this debate cannot be settled by an appeal to the full or near-full 
self-ownership thesis. Natural resources, by definition, are not part of, and have not 
been produced by, any rational agent. Moreover, since self-ownership rights are not 
rights to take action, full self-ownership rights do not include rights to use or 
encroach upon any natural resources. Having full self-ownership does not even 
guarantee a person the right to breathe air! 
 Since the central moral principle that unites libertarians says nothing about 
natural resource property rights, it is perhaps unsurprising that natural resources 
have been a locus of significant disagreement among libertarians. We will attempt to 
clarify the different basic positions in this contentious debate by considering three 
interrelated questions: 
1. Are natural resources initially owned?  
                                                        
16 By objects of value, we mean objects that serve someone’s needs, desires, wants, interests, or 
values. See (Narveson, 1998: 15). There are also natural objects without value (e.g., a worthless rock) 
and objects that are bad for humans in some way (e.g., toxic natural chemicals). These are not 
resources given our definition and, for simplicity, we do not address the libertarian view on these 
objects here.  
17 A being has moral standing just in case its will or interests matter morally for their own sake. We 
leave open here the possibility that there may be beings with moral standing other than rational 
agents. 
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2. If not, are there any moral restrictions on appropriation of natural 
resources?  
 
3. If so, what are these restrictions? 
In considering these questions, we will assume for simplicity a single generation of 
adults living in a single nation-state. We will briefly consider issues relating to 
minors, intergenerational, and international justice at the end of this chapter.  
 
3.1 Are Natural Resources Initially Owned? 
The first question that divides libertarians is this: Are natural resources 
initially owned? If they are initially owned, then no one may use the owned natural 
resources without either obtaining the owner’s permission or providing the owner 
with appropriate compensation.  
A variety of thinkers (including some libertarians) have endorsed the claim 
that natural resources are initially owned. Some have suggested that natural 
resources should be seen as jointly-owned in the sense that their utilization requires 
a collective decision-making process such as majority decision-making (Grunebaum, 
2000: 54-59) or unanimous consent (Cohen, 1995: 94-95).  
However, the initial joint-ownership idea is open to criticism. As both 
Narveson (1998: 12) and Rothbard (2000: 224) point out, Cohen’s joint-ownership 
proposal would leave individuals unable to enjoy any substantive liberty (since they 
would need others’ permission to even breathe).18 Moreover, Rothbard (2000: 224) 
                                                        
18 Rothbard’s and Narveson’s appeals to substantive liberty to dismiss Cohen’s collective ownership 
proposal open them up to the charge of inconsistency. After all, in dismissing the claims of the 
desperately poor to assistance, Rothbard and Narveson reject the value of substantive liberty and 
defend self-ownership instead. Indeed, Cohen’s (1995: 94-102) purpose in introducing his joint 
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argues that it is simply impractical for billions of people to jointly exercise any sort 
of collective ownership rights over the world’s natural resources. 
Cohen (1995: 102-103) also considers a different type of initial ownership: 
Namely, he suggests that each person might be seen as having initial ownership of 
an equal share of all available natural resources.19 
However, the equal-share initial ownership proposal is also problematic. For 
one thing, it is not clear who should be granted ownership of which share of natural 
resources. And while we could rely on some central authority to allocate ownership 
of particular shares to particular individuals,20 such an authority did not always 
exist and it is unclear how equal-initial-ownership proposals would work in its 
absence.  
Due to these problems, the vast majority of libertarians reject the initial 
ownership view. They hold instead that natural resources are initially unowned and 
morally available for anyone’s use. We will refer to this as the common-use view and 
the initial situation as the common-use state. On this view, actions like picking apples 
from a tree or bathing in a stream do not require anyone’s permission nor do they 
generate any duties of compensation (Roark, 2012: 689) 
Though quite popular among libertarians, the common-use view is also open 
to criticism. One key problem is that, intuitively, there seem to be significant moral 
restrictions even on mere natural resource use when there is scarcity and when a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
natural resource ownership proposal is precisely to force libertarians to recognize the importance of 
substantive liberty. 
19 Cohen mistakenly attributes this view to Steiner. Although Steiner holds that every person has an 
initial moral claim to an equal share of natural resources, he holds that no one initially has ownership 
of any particular share (Steiner, 1994: 235 fn. 211). The appropriation process determines which 
person obtains ownership rights over which particular natural resources.  
20 An example of this is Dworkin’s (1981: 283-290) natural resource auction. 
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person uses a large portion of the available natural resources (Roark, 2012: 695). 
For example, it seems wrong for a person in the common-use state to bathe in the 
only source of potable water (thus fowling it for everyone else) or to pick one of the 
three remaining apples in society without providing any compensation to others. 
Yet the proponents of the traditional common-use view seem committed to 
permitting these actions.  
Despite this criticism, the majority of contemporary libertarians continue to 
endorse the common-use view. However, they do not insist that natural resources 
must remain in the common-use state forever. Instead, they hold that individuals 
have a moral power to appropriate (i.e., acquire ownership of) previously unowned 
natural resources, at least under certain conditions.21 The key philosophical 
question, which we turn to next, concerns the conditions under which an individual 
may appropriate natural resources. 
 
3.2 No Moral Restrictions on Appropriation 
One answer to this question, endorsed by libertarians like Rothbard (2000) 
and Narveson (1998), is that there are no moral restrictions on natural resource 
appropriation (libertarians who endorse this position are sometimes called radical-
right libertarians). On this view, individuals not only have a liberty-right to use 
natural resources in the common-use state, they also have an unconditional moral 
                                                        
21 An interesting question, which we cannot address here, concerns the boundaries of the 
appropriated property. When I appropriate land, do I also obtain rights to the space above the land? 
If so, how far up? Do I obtain rights to what is below the land? How far below?  
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power to acquire permanent ownership of currently unowned natural resources by 
some taking action (e.g., laboring on the resource).22  
 However, many theorists have criticized this radical-right libertarian 
position. Primarily, critics have questioned whether merely being a first-comer 
should entitle a person to the enormous value of undeveloped natural resources.23 
And while some radical-right libertarians (e.g., Narveson, 1998; Rothbard, 2000: 
225-226) have argued that human activity is responsible for the entire value of 
natural resources, this position has been criticized (Mazor, 2009: 43-52). If natural 
objects indeed have a value that has not been created by anyone, it is not clear why 
first-comers should be able to appropriate this entire value for themselves. 
 
3.3 The Equal Claims View and Restrictions on Appropriation 
 In fact, many libertarians endorse restrictions on natural resource 
appropriation. They hold (implicitly or explicitly) that all individuals have some 
type of initial moral claims24 to natural resources – claims that fall short of initial 
ownership, but which nevertheless ground, not only liberty-rights to use natural 
resources, but also conditional immunities against the loss of these liberty-rights. In 
this section, we will consider theories that hold that individuals have equal initial 
moral claims to natural resources. We will refer to this as the equal claims view. 
                                                        
22 There is significant debate over the precise actions that are necessary to appropriate natural 
resources. Some libertarians argue that appropriation requires mixing one’s labor with a natural 
resource (Rothbard, 2000: 223-227). Others insist that first possession is all that is necessary for 
appropriation (Narveson, 1998: 11). Still others suggest that it is only necessary to publically stake a 
claim (Vallentyne, 2007: 273). We will not explore this debate here.  
23 For a version of this criticism, see (Otsuka, 2003: 23-24).  
24 These are moral claims in the broad sense of the term rather than Hohfeldian claim-rights. 
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Under what conditions can individuals lose their liberty-rights to use 
particular natural resources? Several prominent libertarians have answered this 
question by appealing to Locke’s (1980: §33) famous contention that one person’s 
appropriation of natural resources may be permissible (i.e., does not run afoul of 
others’ initial moral claims to natural resources) as long as it leaves others with 
“enough and as good.” This is known as the Lockean Proviso. The key debate among 
these libertarians has been about the interpretation of this proviso. 
 Nozick (1974: 176-177) defends the following interpretation of the proviso: 
He suggests that one person’s appropriation must leave “enough and as good” only 
in the sense that others are no worse off than they would have been had all natural 
resources remained in the common-use state. 
Nozick’s account of permissible natural resource appropriation is open to a 
wide variety of objections (Kymlicka, 2001: 111-121), and here we will focus on the 
one we take to be the most important: Like the natural resource appropriation 
theories of Rothbard and Narveson, Nozick’s theory condones enormous, seemingly 
arbitrary inequality in the distribution of natural resource wealth.25 As G. A. Cohen 
(1995: 79-80) points out, Nozick’s theory would allow one person to appropriate all 
available natural resources as long as she pays others a wage to work her natural 
resources that is just high enough so that they are no worse off than they would 
have been in the common-use state. And since the common-use state is likely to be 
quite poor (due to the lack of sufficient incentive to develop or forebear from 
                                                        
25 While Nozick (unlike the radical-right libertarians) accepts that there are restrictions on natural 
resource appropriation, he ultimately condones very unequal distributions of natural resource 
ownership (which is why he is classified as a right libertarian).  
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overusing natural resources), the morally required wages would be fairly low. As 
Otsuka (2003: 23-24) argues, this outcome seems both blatantly unfair and 
implausible as an interpretation of the requirement to leave “enough and as good” 
for others. 
Hillel Steiner offers a different account of the Lockean Proviso. Steiner claims 
that a person has left “enough and as good” if and only if she has appropriated no 
more than an equally valuable share of pristine natural resources (1994, pp. 235-
36). Since the first appropriator is not morally permitted to appropriate a share that 
is any greater in value than the share taken by the last appropriator, Steiner’s 
proviso is not subject to the criticism that it grants a significant unfair advantage to 
first-appropriators.26  
However, the equal share interpretation of the Lockean Proviso is subject to 
a different criticism: Namely, it is insensitive to unfair inequalities in individual 
circumstances (Quong, 2011: 68-70).  
To see the problem, assume a world with only two people and a single 
natural resource called manna. Imagine that one of the people has an illness 
(through no fault of his own) that makes it the case that he needs two thirds of the 
available manna to survive while the other person only needs one third to survive. 
Would it be just to permit to healthy person to appropriate half of the manna? 
Otsuka argues that it would not. He explicitly rejects the position that all 
individuals have equal initial moral claims to natural resources. Instead, he holds 
                                                        
26 Steiner (1994, p. 268) does, however, like most libertarians, condone individuals’ appropriation of 
more than the benchmark share as long as they pay redress for the excess share equal to the market 
value of the over-appropriated natural resources to those who have under-appropriated. We do not 
address this part of Steiner’s theory here. 
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that those who are unfairly disadvantaged have greater initial moral claims to 
natural resources than do the unfairly advantaged (Otsuka, 2003: 29). Otsuka 
endorses conditions on natural resource appropriation that aim to mitigate these 
unfair inequalities (as does Vallentyne). We now turn to considering this type of 
view on permissible appropriation in greater detail.  
 
3.4 Equality-Aimed Restrictions on Appropriation 
To understand Otsuka and Vallentyne’s accounts of permissible natural 
resource appropriation, it is first necessary to understand their conception of unfair 
inequality. Vallentyne (2002) and Otsuka (2003: 25) hold that it is unfair that some 
have less opportunity for welfare than others. Although it is impermissible on their 
view to violate anyone’s self-ownership to correct for inequalities in opportunities 
for welfare, they endorse restrictions on natural resource appropriation that go at 
least part of the way towards correcting these inequalities. That is, they endorse 
equality-of-opportunity-for-welfare-aimed restrictions on natural resource 
appropriation (or equality-aimed restrictions for short). 
While Ostuka and Vallentyne’s theories (like Steiner’s) do not significantly 
advantage first-comers, they are subject to a variety of other potential criticisms. 
One potential criticism (from the left) is that these theorists give too much weight to 
self-ownership relative to equality of opportunity for welfare. Once it is conceded 
that equality of opportunity for welfare is an important moral value, it seems 
strange (though not philosophically incoherent) to effectively grant self-ownership 
lexical priority over this egalitarian value. Why are fairly minor violations of self-
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ownership (e.g., painlessly taking a small amount of blood) more important than 
very large gains in equality of opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 2010: 184)? 
A second criticism is that these theorists do not go far enough in their pursuit 
of equality of opportunity for welfare, even given an unwavering commitment to 
self-ownership. After all, it is possible to have a regime of natural resource 
ownership that is wholly consistent with full self-ownership while at the same time 
fully achieving equality of opportunity for welfare (e.g., by requiring the advantaged 
to transfer sufficient resources to the disadvantaged as a condition of breathing air). 
Yet neither Vallentyne nor Otsuka calls for such a regime.27 
 A third criticism, this time from the right, is that this type of libertarian 
theory appeals to the wrong notion of fairness. Many theorists, including several 
right-leaning liberal theorists, argue that, rather than requiring any type of equality, 
fairness requires respecting individuals’ claims to the fruits of their labor (including 
natural talents).28 If this is what fairness requires, then it would be unfair to adjust 
downward the amount of natural resources a person can appropriate simply 
because her labor has been (or can be anticipated to be) particularly productive 
(e.g., as a result of more economically valuable natural talents). A fuller discussion of 
                                                        
27 Vallentyne (Tideman and Vallentyne, 2001: 451-452) holds that appropriation makes the 
appropriator morally liable for transferring only the competitive market value of the natural resource 
and no more to those with lower opportunity for welfare. Yet this limit seems somewhat ad hoc. 
Otsuka (2003: 32) argues that the natural resource appropriation regime should be structured to 
promote equality of opportunity for welfare subject to the caveat that the resulting natural resource 
property rights regime not excessively curtail the substantive liberty (i.e., what Otsuka calls the 
“robust self-ownership”) of the more advantaged. However, it is unclear why the value of “robust 
self-ownership” is appealed to here whereas elsewhere Otsuka finds non-robust (i.e., traditional) 
self-ownership to be a sufficient conception of liberty. 
28 See, for example (Munzer, 1990: 254-291). See also Chapters Seven and Eight of (Miller, 1999). For 
criticism, see (Vallentyne, 2012). 
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these criticisms and Vallentyne and Otsuka’s potential responses is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
To sum up, most contemporary libertarians agree that natural resources are 
initially unowned. But they disagree about the restrictions on natural resource 
appropriation. Radical-right libertarians like Narveson and Rothbard hold that there 
are no restrictions on appropriation. Nozick and Steiner, on the other hand, endorse 
restrictions on appropriation that are based on the view that individuals have equal 
initial moral claims to natural resources. Vallentyne and Otsuka also endorse 
restrictions on appropriation. But they hold that those who are unfairly 
disadvantaged have greater moral claims to natural resources than do others. They 
endorse conditions on appropriation that aim to mitigate unfair inequalities. These 
different libertarian views on natural resource appropriation and their relationship 
to the traditional left/right libertarian divide are summarized below. 
 
 
4. Property Rights in Artifacts and Distributive Justice 
The final major category of property rights that we have not yet discussed is 
property rights in artifacts (natural resources that have been improved through 
 
Left Libertarians Right Libertarians 
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Appropriation 
Restrictions 
Nozick Steiner Otsuka 
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Appropriation 
Restrictions  
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No Restrictions 
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human action). If we accept a libertarian account of self-ownership and natural 
resource property rights, the libertarian account of property rights in artifacts is not 
at all complex. These property rights simply arise as a result of voluntary exercises 
of pre-existing property rights (self-ownership rights, natural resource property 
rights, and property rights in pre-existing artifacts). 
Here is a simple example: Albert owns land with some apple trees on it. He 
makes Bella the following offer: If she would pick 100 of his apples, she can have 30 
of the apples she picks. We can describe this offer more formally as follows: Albert 
conditionally transfers all of his property rights to 30 of his unpicked apples to Bella 
(while also authorizing Bella to encroach upon his land and apple trees) in exchange 
for Bella transferring certain limited, time-sensitive self-ownership control rights to 
Albert. Once Bella has picked the 100 apples, she gains ownership of 30 of them 
while Albert now owns 70 picked apples. The picked apples are examples of 
artifacts.  
Having discussed self-ownership, property rights in natural resources, and 
property rights in artifacts (i.e., the vast majority of property rights in society),29 
surprisingly little remains to be explained about the libertarian view of distributive 
justice (at least as a matter of ideal theory).30 This is because libertarians generally 
do not appeal to particular end-state principles to determine the proper distribution 
                                                        
29 We have already explicitly mentioned certain entities (e.g., animals) that are not necessarily 
included in this discussion. We will raise some other exceptions (e.g., minors) in the final section of 
this chapter. 
30 We will briefly return to the issue of rectificatory justice (what should be done when property 
rights have been violated in the past) in the final section of this chapter. 
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of economic benefits and burdens in society.31 The just distribution of benefits and 
burdens is simply that which arises from the voluntary exercise of property rights. 
Once we understand the libertarian account of these property rights (and 
particularly self-ownership and property rights in natural resources), the libertarian 
account of distributive justice follows straightforwardly. 
However, while this account of distributive justice may be parsimonious, it is 
certainly not uncontroversial. We turn now to briefly considering several prominent 
objections to this account having to do with the role of luck, the moral limits of 
markets, discrimination, paternalism, unjust prices, the libertarian notion of 
freedom, the plight of the desperately poor, and the conflict between economic 
prosperity and property rights. 
 
4.1 Brute Luck  
 Some theorists criticize libertarianism by pointing out that many of the 
differences in the economic benefits and burdens enjoyed by individuals can be 
traced back to factors for which the individuals themselves are not morally 
responsible. They are thus unjust (because unfair). For example, no one can be said 
to be responsible for the natural talents that they are born with (they are the result 
of an unchosen genetic lottery and thus a matter of brute luck). Many theorists who 
make this argument call for the rejection of the full or near-full self ownership thesis 
                                                        
31 The exceptions are those libertarians who endorse equality-aimed restrictions on natural resource 
property rights. These libertarians still view distributive justice solely in terms of exercise of 
property rights. But the conditions on individuals’ natural resources property rights (and, by 
extension on the artifacts made with natural resources) can change depending on how the owner 
fares in terms of equality of opportunity for welfare relative to others. 
 23 
and advocate redistribution of wealth to correct for unfair inequalities in economic 
benefits (Arneson, 2006). 
As we have seen, some libertarians have been willing to accommodate this 
concern to some extent by structuring natural resource property rights to address 
these types of unfair inequalities (see Section 3.4 above). However, they have not 
been willing to abandon the commitment to full or near-full self-ownership in 
response to this criticism. 
 
4.2 The Moral Limits of Markets 
 Libertarians generally do not place any moral constraints on individuals’ 
transfer rights. This means that in theory at least, everything is available for sale. 
This includes organs, life preservers, and sex. A person can even sell herself into 
slavery if she so chooses.  
A variety of theorists have criticized this aspect of libertarianism. They have 
advocated limits to what can be bought and sold on the market based on protecting 
human dignity (Sandel, 2012), preserving the social meaning of the goods in 
question (Anderson, 1990), and respecting fellow citizens as moral equals (Satz, 
2010). However, libertarians have generally refused to condone restrictions on 
transfer rights on the basis of these values. 
 
4.3 Discrimination 
 Another troubling implication of the libertarian commitment to unrestricted 
transfer rights is the permissibility (as a matter of justice) of all forms 
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discrimination (Freeman, 2001: 135-136). Imagine that, although Carol is a better 
apple picker than Betsy, Albert refuses to hire her to pick his apples because she is 
black and Albert believes that blacks are “dirty.” Although libertarians can condemn 
Albert’s discriminatory action as immoral, they cannot condemn such action as 
unjust (Vallentyne, 2006). 
 
4.4 Paternalism 
 Another problem with viewing voluntary choice as sacrosanct is this. People 
make mistakes, and sometimes their mistakes have very serious consequences for 
their well-being. Is it always impermissible to encroach on individuals or their 
property for their own good? If a person is about to cross a bridge that 
unbeknownst to him is rotten (and there is no time to inform him), is it really 
impermissible to physically prevent him from crossing the bridge? 
Some libertarians have entertained the possibility of allowing paternalism in 
cases in which the relevant interference does not violate a person’s will.  However, 
most libertarians have refused to endorse any type of encroachment on individuals 
or their property, even for their own good.32 
 
4.5 Just Prices 
 Another important challenge to the libertarian account of distributive justice 
has to do with the distribution of the benefits from individual transactions (a 
critique that some have raised under the heading of just prices). A wide variety of 
                                                        
32 For an excellent discussion, see (Wall, 2009). 
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theorists (e.g.,Wertheimer, 1996) have argued that the distribution of the benefits of 
voluntary exchange might in fact be unjust (e.g., because unfair or exploitative) in 
certain cases (e.g., when one of the parties holds a monopoly on the relevant 
good).33 Libertarians generally reject such criticisms. On the libertarian view, as 
long as a bargain was agreed to voluntarily, there can be no legitimate claim that the 
term of the bargain are unjust.34 
 
4.6 An Overly Narrow Notion of Freedom? 
Others have criticized libertarianism for endorsing an implausibly narrow 
notion of freedom (Olsaretti, 2009b: 101-161). Although libertarians sometimes 
cast themselves as defending freedom very broadly, understood as a “right to decide 
what would become of [oneself] and what [one] would do…” (Nozick 1974, p. 171), 
libertarians are seemingly unconcerned (at least as a matter of justice) with 
individuals who are forced by their circumstances into certain courses of actions. A 
well-known example is the worker who has no acceptable choice (e.g., she would 
starve otherwise) but to work for the capitalist for whatever the wage the capitalist 
offers (Cohen, 1995: 34-37). 
 Some libertarians have responded by pointing out that, while the worker 
may be forced to work, she is not coerced into working. Unjust restrictions on 
freedom arise, on the libertarian view, when one person causes another person to 
                                                        
33 Libertarians sometimes suggest that monopoly prices will not be a problem as long as unjust legal 
barriers to entry in markets are removed (Nozick, 1974: 17). When profits are very high, new firms 
will have incentive to enter the relevant market, and this will drive down prices. However, as 
economists (e.g., Stiglitz, 2000: 78) have long recognized, there are a variety of non-legal barriers to 
entry in many cases (e.g., very high fixed costs in certain industries).  
34 See, for example, (Nozick, 1974: 63-65). An important exception is Steiner (1984) who calls into 
question the justness of agreements whose terms were affected by a previous rights violation. 
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be forced to choose a certain path by violating (or threatening to violate) her rights. 
Since there is no rights-violating coercion in the case of the worker, it is perfectly 
coherent for the libertarian to resist seeing her plight as a matter of justice (Barnes, 
2012).  
Critics of libertarianism have conceded that coercion may raise special moral 
concerns.  However, these critics continue to argue that the lack of acceptable 
alternatives by some individuals (e.g., the worker) can call into question the justice 
of the arrangements into which those individuals enter (Olsaretti, 2013). 
 
4.7 Desperate Poverty 
 Another objection to the libertarian account of distributive justice is that it 
implausibly privileges individuals’ property rights in artifacts over the moral claims 
of the desperately poor. Imagine that someone (e.g., David) is suffering from serious 
malnutrition even though he owns his rightful share of natural resource wealth.35 
Why should David not be given property rights to, say, some of Bella apples? 
Some readers may view the moral claims of the desperately poor as 
obviously more weighty than the artifact property rights of the well-off. Libertarians 
can offer two responses that should at least give such readers some pause.  First 
(and most famously), libertarians argue that redistribution of human-made wealth 
is on a par with forced labor (Nozick, 1974: 169-170). Redistributing 10 apples from 
Bella to David is morally akin to forcing Bella to work for David for the time it took 
Bella to pick those apples.  
                                                        
35 For example, under Vallentyne’s theory, if natural resources are perfectly plentiful so that they lack 
a market value, David would not be due any transfers from Bella. 
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There have admittedly been many criticisms of the analogy between 
redistribution of wealth and forced labor (e.g., Fried, 2004: 80). However, even if the 
analogy is not perfect, there is at least some sense in which redistribution morally 
akin to forced labor. When rights to the apples that Bella picked are transferred 
from Bella to David without Bella’s consent, there is some sense in which Bella is 
used as a means for David’s ends.  After all, Bella’s labor has benefitted David rather 
than Bella against Bella’s will.  Insofar as there is a problem with some individuals 
being used as a means for others’ ends, there does seem to be at least a weighty 
argument against redistribution of human-made wealth.  
Libertarians can also point out that an account of distributive justice that 
always allows desperate poverty (or even blameless desperate poverty) to trump 
respect for property rights in human-made wealth would have implications that few 
would be willing to accept. Such an account would, for example, require a massive 
redistribution of human-made wealth from individuals in wealthy countries to poor 
individuals in the developing world.36 Some (e.g., Nagel, 2005) have tried to resist 
this implication by appealing to the moral relevance of state borders. However, for 
those unconvinced that political boundaries have this type of normative force, the 
libertarian insistence on the moral importance of property rights provides a 
promising alternative avenue for resisting the radical demands for massive global 
redistribution. 
 
                                                        
36 Of course, not everyone finds this implication to be unattractive.  Some (e.g., Unger, 1996) have 
even made the positive case for such redistribution. 
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4.8 Economic Prosperity vs. Property Rights 
Libertarian society is often pictured as highly unequal but also wealthy 
overall due to the power of free enterprise, well-defined property rights, and the 
lack of stifling government regulation. However, in reality, an unwavering 
commitment to property rights can (counterintuitively perhaps) generate very 
serious economic difficulties. Indeed, as economists have long recognized in their 
discussion of market failures, a system of voluntary exchanges can fail to realize 
significant economic benefits in a wide variety of circumstances (Stiglitz, 2000: 77-
90).  
It is difficult to understate the economic problems that such market failures 
could potentially cause in a libertarian society. Who would build the roads? Who 
would have an incentive to undertake technological innovation in the absence of at 
least temporary protection from competition? How would money work? Libertarian 
society might not only have pockets of desperate poverty. It could also be fairly poor 
overall. 
Libertarians have several responses to this objection. Some (e.g., Mack, 1986) 
have argued that critics underestimate the potential of private market solution to 
so-called market failures. Others (Nozick, 1974: 79) have responded to this problem 
by stepping back from their absolute commitment to property rights, often in 
contexts in which unaddressed market failures would have the most economically 
debilitating consequences.37  
                                                        
37 Nozick (1974: 79) does not insist that a polluter must obtain the explicit consent of every person 
whose rights might be encroached upon by her air pollution (since insisting an explicit consent 
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However, libertarians can also point out that other theories of distributive 
justice either fail to address the conflict between respect for property rights and 
aggregate economic benefits or, in the case of utilitarianism, choose to sacrifice 
property rights for the sake of aggregate benefits in ways that are unattractive.  For 
example, utilitarianism could easily condone policies that force a few people from 
their homes for the sake of a private redevelopment project that is only moderately 
beneficial for society as a whole. The unattractive implications of these alternative 
theories at least raise the possibility that, despite its problems, some version of 
libertarianism might be the most plausible account of distributive justice on offer, 
all things considered. 
 
5. Directions for Future Research 
 Before concluding, we would like to briefly highlight five topics for future 
research that have particularly important implications for libertarian accounts of 
distributive justice.38 These involve the moral status of minors, future people, and 
people in other nation-states, property rights in non-divisible natural resources, and 
rectificatory justice. In laying out these topics for future research, our focus will be 
on raising important questions and on providing the reader with references to 
further reading. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
would almost surely lead to a society in which no pollution at all could occur – a society which would 
be very poor indeed). 
38 Note that there are many other important areas for further research, including the moral status of 
animals and preventative justice (i.e., what a person may do to prevent potential rights violations), 
which we do not discuss here because they have relatively few implications for distributive justice. 
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5.1 Minors 
 Throughout this chapter, we have assumed that the only beings with moral 
standing are autonomous agents. This leaves out sufficiently young children as well 
as severely cognitively impaired adults (i.e., minors). The treatment of minors raises 
important questions for libertarianism. Can minors be owned by others? Do minors 
have any rights? 39 Should the proviso on appropriation of natural resources take 
minors into account? If so, how? Who has a duty to ensure that the rights of minors 
are respected?40 Who, if anyone, has the right, and perhaps duty, to be the minors’ 
custodians (Vallentyne, 2003b)? Since so much of what matters for distributive 
justice happens before we reach majority, the questions regarding the status of 
minors are clearly a pressing topic for future research. 
 
5.2 Intergenerational Justice 
 We have assumed throughout that there is only a single generation of people. 
What is the moral status of past people and their wishes? Do future people who will 
definitely exist have moral standing? Do future people who may exist, but also may 
not exist, have standing? If they have standing, do they have full self-ownership (e.g., 
that can be violated by burying a toxin that will be released in 100 years)? Does the 
                                                        
39 Those who endorse the choice-protecting conception of rights deny that minors have any rights 
(since they lack any autonomous agency to protect). Those who endorse an interest-protecting 
conception of rights (or a hybrid conception) can hold that minors have rights (since they have 
interests to protect). For a superb analysis of choice-protecting vs. interest-protecting rights, see 
(Kramer, Simmonds, and Steiner, 1998). For discussion of whether children have a form of self-
ownership, see (Vallentyne, 2003b; Andersson, 2007). 
40 For discussion of who has the duty to provide children with their fair share of wealth, see 
(Rakowski, 1991: Chapter 7; Casal and Williams, 1995; Vallentyne, 2002; Olsaretti, 2009a; Steiner 
and Vallentyne, 2009). 
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proviso give them a right to some share of the value of natural resources?41 The 
moral status of future people has important implications for a variety of issues in 
distributive justice such as obligations of environmental protection/conservation. 
 
5.3 International Justice 
We have assumed above a single nation-state. However, there are important 
questions of international distributive justice that arise once we relax this 
assumption. Libertarians uniformly agree that national boundaries make no 
difference with respect to self-ownership. But do individuals in a particular nation-
state have special moral claims to the natural resources within their borders?42 Who 
has property rights to natural resources that span national borders? 
 
5.4 Non-Divisible Natural Resources 
 Another important area for future research concerns property rights in 
natural resources that cannot be straightforwardly divided into individually 
appropriatable portions. Consider, for example, rights to the atmosphere. Although 
we could try to grant individuals the power to appropriate specific portions of the 
atmosphere, the molecules will move around and thus the portions will not be 
stable. How, then, should rights to the atmosphere be assigned on the libertarian 
view?43 
 
                                                        
41 For a discussion, see (Fabre, 2009; Steiner and Vallentyne, 2009; Mazor, 2010). 
42 For an argument that natural resources are commonly owned, see (Risse, 2012: Chapter 6). For 
general discussion, see (Steiner, 1999; Tideman and Vallentyne, 2001)  
43 For one Lockean view on rights to the atmosphere, see (Bovens, 2011) 
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5.5 Rectificatory Justice  
 The final pressing area for future research is rectificatory justice (the rights 
that individuals have as a result of previous rights violation). Given the centrality of 
historical transactions in legitimating the current distribution of property rights in 
libertarianism, questions of rectificatory justice have enormous importance for the 
libertarian account of distributive justice. Is there a right to punitive damages, or is 
rectification limited to victim restoration/compensation?44 Is the duty to 
compensate based on strict liability or is it sensitive to agent-responsibility for the 
harm imposed (e.g., how foreseeable it was)? Is there a moral statute of limitations 
on the rights of rectification (after which a right ceases to be valid)? If so what? If 
not, how should one proceed, given that we have very little knowledge of what 
rectification requires for the massive and systematic injustice of the distant past?45  
 
6. Conclusion  
 Our goal in this chapter has been to explore the libertarian account of 
distributive justice, including internal disagreements, external criticisms, and areas 
for future research. We began with a discussion of self-ownership and considered 
criticisms relating to indeterminacy, small incursions (or risks of incursions) and 
enforceable duties of assistance. We then turned to natural resource property rights 
and considered the debate over whether natural resources are initially owned and, 
if not, the conditions under which they may be appropriated. Finally, we discussed 
                                                        
44 See (Barnett, 1977; 1998) for a defense of the claim that there is a right only to victim restoration. 
45 Nozick (1974: 231) indicates an openness to a one-time Rawlsian redistribution of wealth to 
rectify massive past injustices. Narveson (2009), on the other hand, argues that, in the absence of 
specific compelling evidence, one should act as if the status quo is just. 
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the libertarian account of just economic activity, surveyed a variety of criticisms of 
this account, and concluded by raising important topics for future research. 
 As we recognized throughout this chapter, libertarianism is subject to many 
criticisms. Moreover, there are many gaps and unresolved issues. However, no 
theory is beyond reproach, and we believe that libertarianism has much to offer 
philosophers interested in questions relating to the just distribution of economic 
benefits and burdens. 
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